Zero-touch enrollment
The laptop's serial is checked against your Autopilot registrations through Microsoft Graph, and its identity is bound to its TPM. Kickstart, autoinstall and Omarchy install templates come included.
Tuxhold encrypts, escrows, locks and wipes your developers' Linux laptops, signs them in with Entra ID or Okta, scores them against CIS, and gives your auditor the evidence. It runs alongside Intune or Jamf, so you don't have to replace them.
Rust agent · signed apt, dnf and pacman repositories · hosted on Cloudflare or self-hosted
Works with the identity and compliance stack you already run
Your Windows and Mac fleet has encryption, escrow, remote wipe and a compliance signal. Your developers' Linux laptops usually get a compliance checkbox, a script runner, or nothing at all.
Intune's Linux compliance policy checks distro version, encryption, password rules and custom scripts, on Ubuntu and RHEL with GNOME. It has no remote lock or wipe for Linux.1, 2
So teams stack tools: an osquery agent for posture, an EDR, a separate wipe product and the IdP. Then an engineer collects screenshots every audit cycle. Fedora and Arch-based laptops often sit outside every one of those tools.
One Rust agent and one console cover enrollment, sign-in, encryption, response and evidence, so you aren't stitching five tools together.
The laptop's serial is checked against your Autopilot registrations through Microsoft Graph, and its identity is bound to its TPM. Kickstart, autoinstall and Omarchy install templates come included.
People sign in at the login screen with Entra ID, Okta or any OIDC provider. Directory groups decide who may sign in and who gets sudo, and cached sign-in still works offline.
LUKS2, sealed to the TPM so the laptop boots without a prompt. The recovery key is escrowed to the console and rotated automatically after anyone retrieves it.
Lock a session, put a missing laptop in lost mode that survives reboots, or crypto-erase it. A wipe needs the serial typed in, and you can require a second admin to approve it.
OpenSCAP scores Ubuntu and Fedora against CIS Level 1. The agent fixes only the rules you have allowed in a signed allowance, and logs each fix with who signed it.
Publishes device compliance to Google Context-Aware Access, to Entra alongside the Intune app, and to Okta (beta), so access policies can count Linux laptops too.
Every policy and command is signed and checked against a pinned key, with rollback protection. A laptop off the network keeps enforcing its last good policy.
Packages through apt, dnf, pacman and Flatpak. Screen lock, password rules and USB device control. Known vulnerabilities from the distro feeds and CISA's exploited list.
Every admin action lands in an audit log with who did it. Export a proof bundle the auditor can verify offline. Evidence connectors for Vanta and Drata are coming soon.
The TPM signs a quote of the boot measurements, and the server checks it against the event log. Secure Boot state is part of the device's compliance.
On vPro hardware, an optional AMT layer gives the console power control and a path to the machine that doesn't depend on the OS.
A hosted service on Cloudflare, with each customer in its own isolated Worker and storage. Or run the server yourself with Helm or Docker Compose.
Install from an installer template, or add the agent from the signed repository. The serial is checked against Autopilot and the device identity is bound to its TPM.
The person signs in at the login screen with their Entra ID or Okta account. Their groups decide access and sudo.
A signed policy seals the disk to the TPM, escrows the key, locks the screen and installs software. CIS Level 1 is scored and fixed under your allowance.
Compliance flows to your IdP. Every action is in the audit log, and a proof bundle exports for SOC 2 and ISO 27001 reviews.
Our research found no competitor that documents TPM-sealed LUKS, central key escrow, cryptographic wipe and IdP sign-in at the desktop together on Linux. Tuxhold ships them as one chain.
Secure Boot and the boot chain are measured into the TPM, and remote attestation proves it to the server.
TPM quote · event log · Secure BootThe disk key is sealed to those measurements. A changed boot path or a foreign initramfs leaves the disk closed.
LUKS2 · TPM2 · PCR policyThe recovery key is sealed on the server. Every retrieval is audited, and the agent rotates the key afterwards.
audited retrieval · rotationOnly people your directory allows can sign in, and taking someone out of the group takes their access away.
Entra ID · Okta · OIDCWipe destroys the encryption keys, so the data is unreadable rather than "probably deleted".
key slots destroyed · serial-confirmedPolicies and commands are signed (ES256) and checked against a key pinned at enrollment, with rollback protection. A compromised network can't push a policy or a wipe.
Wipe asks for the device's serial, and you can require a second admin to approve it. Every request, approval and result is in the audit log.
Lost mode holds across reboots and can revoke the TPM unlock, so a stolen laptop asks for the recovery key it doesn't have.
Automatic fixes run only under an allowance a person signed, and Activity names that allowance and its signer next to each change.
On the hosted service each customer runs in its own Cloudflare Worker with its own Durable Objects, and every device gets its own state object.
Enrollment checks the TPM's endorsement key, and you can require a manufacturer certificate. Device certificates are issued per device.
We keep a status record that separates verified on hardware, verified on VMs, and built but not yet verified. Ask us for it.
Each competitor cell comes from that vendor's own documentation, linked below. "No" means the vendor doesn't offer it or doesn't document it.
| Capability | Intune for Linux | Fleet | Canonical Landscape | Tuxhold |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IdP sign-in at the desktop | NoApp sign-in only | NoIdP at setup only | Yesauthd, Ubuntu only10 | YesEntra ID, Okta, OIDC |
| Zero-touch enrollment | NoNo bulk enrollment3 | PartialIdP gate at setup | Experimental13 | YesAutopilot serial check via Graph |
| Disk encryption | Check only1 | Check onlyMust be set at install4 | At installTPM-backed FDE, Ubuntu 26.048 | Enforced at installExisting disks reported, not converted |
| Central recovery-key escrow | No1 | YesPassphrase, Premium4 | Not documented8 | YesRotated after each retrieval |
| TPM sealing of LUKS | No | No | YesLocal, Ubuntu 26.048 | Yes |
| Remote TPM attestation | No | NoTPM identity certificate only | No | Yes |
| Remote lock and lost mode | No2 | Script-based5 | No9 | Yes |
| Remote wipe | No2 | File deletion"Data may be recoverable"5 | No9 | Crypto-erase |
| CIS benchmark audit and fixes | NoBash scripts | NomacOS and Windows only6 | YesUSG, Ubuntu only12 | YesUbuntu, Fedora; Omarchy baseline |
| Compliance signal to your IdP | EntraMicrosoft 365 web apps in Edge | NoLinux excluded7 | Not documented | Google, Entra, OktaEntra with the Intune app; Okta in beta |
| Linux distributions | Ubuntu, RHELGNOME required17 | WideIncluding Arch and Omarchy | Ubuntu only | Ubuntu, Fedora, Omarchy |
| Public price | $8/user/monthPlan 1; in M365 E3/E516 | $7/host/monthPremium18 | $25/desktop/yearUbuntu Pro11 | Early accessSee pricing |
Vendor documentation was read in November 2026 and changes often. If something here is out of date, tell us at hello@tuxhold.com and we'll fix it.
Not only the one your MDM vendor happens to support. x86_64 laptops, packages from signed repositories.
24.04 LTS
Fedora 44
Arch-based
Running something else? Tell us what your fleet runs.
Keep Intune or Jamf for Windows and Mac. Add Tuxhold for the Linux laptops they can't manage.
For a first Linux team. Work with us directly while we shape the product.
The full laptop lifecycle for your Linux fleet, hosted by us.
Run the server in your own environment, for sovereignty or network rules.
Indicative early-access pricing. These figures show where we expect to land and aren't an offer or a quote. Final pricing, tiers and terms will be agreed with each customer.
No. Tuxhold manages your Linux laptops and runs next to the MDM you already use for Windows and Mac. It uses the same identity provider and Autopilot registrations, so Linux is no longer the exception in your device program.
Partly. Microsoft lets only Intune (or an approved Windows MDM) set Entra's compliant flag on a device. Tuxhold publishes its verdict to an Entra device attribute alongside the Intune app, which Conditional Access filters can use. For Google Workspace, our signal feeds Context-Aware Access directly. The Okta signal is in beta.
They can enroll and get policy, sign-in, CIS scoring, lock and lost mode. Disk encryption is set up by our installer templates at install time. On an existing laptop Tuxhold reports whether the disk is encrypted, but it doesn't convert an unencrypted disk in place.
You choose. Directory groups decide who gets sudo. CIS fixes are applied only for the rules you allow in a signed allowance, and everything else is reported, not forced. Packages from apt, dnf, pacman and Flatpak still work as usual.
The hosted service runs on Cloudflare, with each customer in its own isolated Worker and storage. If you need to keep it in your own environment, you can self-host the server with Helm or Docker Compose.
x86_64 laptops with a TPM 2.0. TPM sealing and attestation need the TPM; Intel AMT features need vPro hardware. We test on real Lenovo hardware and on Azure Trusted Launch VMs.
Yes. It measures what auditors ask for on every in-scope computer: disk encryption, screen lock, antivirus, password manager and OS updates, plus CIS scores and an audit trail of admin actions. Proof bundles export for your auditor today, and connectors for Vanta and Drata are coming soon.
We're onboarding a small group of Entra-, Okta- and Google-first teams with Linux developer fleets.